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Abstract 
In 2013 the OECD introduced its Action Plan on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). One 
of the major concerns of this Plan is a strategic use of intangible assets as an instrument for 
profit shifting. The main purpose of this paper is to test whether multinational enterprises use 
intangibles as an important BEPS channel by empirically analysing the relationship between 
taxation and bilateral royalty flows. We employ the OECD data on 3,660 country-pairs for the 
time period of 1990-2012 and apply the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator in a 
fixed-effects framework. The main results point to a negative impact of taxation on bilateral 
royalty flows. Moreover, we find that tax differentials, which represent a relative level of 
taxation in a recipient state compared to other potential royalty recipients, have a significant 
influence on royalty payments as well. For tax policy considerations, the paper provides 
various insights to the ongoing work on BEPS by the G20, the OECD, and the European 
Commission. For example, we find that such reform suggestions of the OECD Action Plan as 
an enforcement of the Nexus Approach, as well as an introduction of strict Controlled Foreign 
Company rules and transfer pricing regulations are likely to reduce international royalty 
flows. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the issue of base erosion and profit shifting has gained importance in the tax 
policy agenda of the OECD2, the G203, and the European Commission4. These organisations 
have formally recognized the harmfulness of BEPS and developed an Action Plan to combat 
it. A special focus of this plan lies on restricting a strategic use of intangible assets for profit 
shifting purposes. To be more precise, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are thought to be 
strategically re/allocating their intangible assets to group members in low-tax jurisdictions, 
which then receive royalty payments from the affiliates that are located in high-tax countries. 
The main goal of this paper is therefore to address the question of whether intangibles 
constitute an important BEPS channel by empirically analysing the role of corporate taxation 
in determining the direction and amounts of international royalty flows. 
The contribution of this study to previous literature is twofold. First of all, we extend 
empirical research on the relationship between taxation and intangibles’ location by 
introducing a different identification strategy. In contrast to the numerous earlier papers, such 
as Huizinga et al. (2008), Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), 
Griffith et al. (2014) this study analyses not an impact of taxation on stocks of intangibles, but 
rather its influence on royalty payments. Secondly, we contribute to the ongoing work on the 
OECD Action Plan by analysing its several reform suggestions and quantifying their potential 
outcomes. For example, this paper provides an empirical investigation of how an enforcement 
of the Nexus Approach5, along with an introduction of strict Controlled Foreign Company 
(CFC) rules and transfer pricing (TP) regulations6 could affect international royalty flows. 
In this study, bilateral royalty flows data from the OECD are used to empirically test the link 
between taxation and royalty payments. Figure 1 presents some interesting insights into the 
data on royalty flows by showing the top worldwide recipients of royalties in 2012. As one 
can see, royalty payments seem to be flowing not only in the typical research and 
development (R&D)-intensive countries, such as the United States, Japan or Germany, but 
also in states with low tax rates, such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Ireland.  
2 See the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Action Plan on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting, 2013, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf 
3.See the OECD/G20 Explanatory Statement – 2014 Deliverables, 2014, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2014-
deliverables-explanatory-statement.pdf 
4.See the Communication from the European Commission on BEPS, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu-
/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/fairer_corporate_taxation/com_2015_302_en.pdf 
5 For more information see the OECD/G20 Action 5: Agreement on Modified Nexus Approach for IP Regimes, 
2015, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-action-5-agreement-on-modified-nexus-approach-for-ip-regimes.pdf 
6 The Nexus Approach, which is relevant for IP Boxes, along with CFC rules, and TP regulations lie in focus of 
respectively Actions 5, 3, and 7 of the OECD Action Plan on BEPS. 
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Figure 1. Top Fifteen Recipients of Royalty Payments (in millions of US Dollars) and their Effective 
Tax Rates (in percent), 2012 
 
Country Tax Rate  Country Tax Rate, % 
United States 35.01  Ireland 12.5 
Japan 41.0  Italy 27.5 
Netherlands 25.0  Korea 22.0 
Switzerland 21.22  Finland 24.5 
Germany 30.22  Belgium 33.9 
United Kingdom 24.0  Denmark 25.0 
France 34.4  Spain 30.0 
Sweden 26.3    
Note:
  1 In addition, some states levy income or capital-based taxes.2 Tax 
rates vary across municipalities; a given rate represents the capital city.  
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is based on estimating an impact of the net 
taxation of royalty payments on the country-to-country royalty flows. The final sample 
includes 3,660 country-pairs for the time period of 1990-2012. The Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood estimator in fixed-effects framework is used in the baseline model. According to 
our results, on average a one percentage point decrease in the net tax rate on royalty payments 
from one country to another leads to a 6.0% increase in their bilateral royalty flows, holding 
other factors constant. In order to quantify the results, one could look at Figure 1. For 
instance, in 2012 total royalty inflows into the United States amounted to $124.2 billion. This 
would imply that if the US together with its partner countries managed to decrease the net 
taxation of its royalty inflows by one percentage point, it could receive $7.4 billion of 
additional royalty payments. 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
2 
 
There are several ways, in which a multinational could take advantage of intangible assets in 
order to minimize its global tax liability. The most effective one is to separate the place, 
where research and development is carried out, from the location, where the income from 
resulting intellectual property (IP) is taxed afterwards. The first country would usually be a 
high-tax jurisdiction, while the second one is typically a low-tax state. Endres and Spengel 
(2015) describe a few strategies that could lead to this outcome. For example, a multinational 
might choose to implement a contract R&D, under which one affiliate conducts R&D 
activities, whereas the other one agrees to bear their financial risks and consequently becomes 
the owner of resulting intangibles. Besides, the more valuable an IP is, the greater amounts of 
royalties will be re-located to the owner of an intangible in a low-tax state. Equivalent 
outcomes might be achieved through a cost sharing agreement. Furthermore, some types of IP 
Box regimes might also provide an opportunity for multinationals to use intangible assets as a 
BEPS channel. This is especially the case in such countries as Cyprus, France, Hungary, 
Liechtenstein, Malta and Switzerland (Nidwalden), where not only self-developed IP, but also 
acquired intangibles are allowed to take advantage of lower IP Box tax rates. Along with 
contract R&Ds and cost-sharing agreements, these types of IP Boxes seem to facilitate BEPS. 
Alternatively, an intangible asset might be sold from an affiliate in a high-tax country to 
another affiliate located in a low-tax jurisdiction. This strategy could nevertheless trigger not 
only a high selling price, but an exit tax in some cases as well. Finally, a multinational might 
also decide to carry out its real research and development activity in a low-tax country. 
However, since the most important input of R&D is human capital, this strategy will probably 
trigger high costs of re-locating domestic researchers or training the local ones. 
An empirical analysis of royalty payments as a channel for profit shifting clearly constitutes a 
research gap in the literature on BEPS. To our best knowledge, there are only a few empirical 
studies that employ data on royalty payments. For example, Grubert (1998), Collins and 
Shackelford (1998) and Mutti and Grubert (2009) conduct cross-section analyses using firm-
level royalties data on US parent companies and their subsidiaries. The authors apply different 
identification strategies, but all of them eventually argue in favour of a negative correlation 
between taxation and the amount or direction of royalty flows. Collins and Shackelford 
(1998)7, for instance, use a framework similar to the one applied in this study. They aggregate 
firm-level data on royalty flows at the country-pair level and calculate the effective taxation 
7 Grubert (1998) and Mutti and Grubert (2009) also find some significant outcomes, but they use different 
identification strategies and provide insufficient statistical information to interpret the economic significance of 
their results or make them comparable to other studies. 
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of these bilateral royalty payments. The authors find the semi-elasticity of royalty flows with 
respect to taxation, when estimated at the sample mean, to be equal to -9.5. This estimate is 
significantly higher than the semi-elasticities of other potential profit-shifting channels that 
the authors test. For example, tax semi-elasticities of dividend and interest payments in the 
same framework are smaller than 1.0. Therefore, their results are consistent with our findings 
and confirm the assumption that intangibles are used by multinationals as an important 
instrument of response to tax changes. 
Our contribution to the papers that employ data on royalty payments lies in introducing a 
different methodology and addressing some new research questions. For example, we exploit 
not only data on the royalty payments between US parent firms and their subsidiaries, but 
rather incorporate sixty-one countries into our analysis. Besides, in comparison to previous 
studies, this one is carried out in a panel-data rather than a cross-section framework. 
Moreover, we examine not only the relationship between net taxation of royalties and bilateral 
royalty flows, but also analyse to which extent royalty payments are affected by the tax rate 
differentials between a given recipient state and other potential royalties’ recipients. In 
addition, we test the influence of some other factors, such as IP Box regimes, R&D tax 
incentives, CFC rules, and transfer pricing regulations on bilateral royalty flows. 
This study also relates to the empirical literature on the impact of taxation on patent 
applications. Ernst and Spengel (2011), Ernst et al. (2014), Griffith et al. (2014) etc. analyse 
the connection between the taxation of royalty income and the quantity or quality of patent 
applications by multinationals. These authors usually find semi-elasticities comparable to the 
findings of Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), who argue that a one percentage point increase in 
tax rate leads to a 3.5-3.8% decrease in the number of patent applications in a given country. 
However, these results might only be the lower bound of the true magnitude of profit shifting 
through intangible assets, when considering some other empirical studies, such as Ernst et al. 
(2014). They show that multinationals are not just likely to locate all their intangibles in tax 
havens, but rather to place their most valuable ones there in the first place. Thus, the 6.0 semi-
elasticity of royalties with respect to tax that we find could result from the combination of 
both effects, because royalty flows reflect information on the location of patents as well as 
their quality. Royalty payments may even capture information on other strategies used by 
multinationals to re-locate their intangibles into low-tax jurisdictions8. 
8 For example, the above-mentioned studies on patent applications are not able to track the change of ownership 
in registered patents. If, however, a patent was eventually sold to a low-tax subsidiary, its royalty inflows would 
increase and it should be reflected in our data. Besides, previous studies only investigated the usage of patents as 
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In order to understand the significance of the effects that we find, it is important to compare 
our findings on the use of intangibles as a BEPS instrument with flows of literature that 
analyse other potential BEPS channels. Dharmapala (2014) reviews a broad range of 
empirical studies on profit shifting and concludes that the primary channels of BEPS are 
generally thought to be a strategic use of inter-affiliate debt and transfer pricing. Indeed 
empirical literature on the effects of taxation on firms’ leverage includes numerous thorough 
studies, such as Desai et al. (2004), Buettner et al. (2012), Buettner and Wamser (2013) etc. 
Their results provide some evidence that a semi-elasticity of the internal debt ratio with 
respect to tax lies between 0.6 and 1.0, which is also consistent with the meta-analysis of this 
literature by Feld et al. (2013). This implies that increasing a tax rate by one percentage point 
leads to a 0.6-1.0% increase in a company’s internal debt ratio. Empirical studies on a 
strategic use of transfer prices for goods and services comprise Clausing (2003), Bernard et al. 
(2006), Davies et al. (2015) etc. These authors usually agree that a one percentage point 
increase in a tax rate leads to a 0.5-1.9% fall in intra-firm transfer prices. 
The range tax semi-elasticity of the literature on such BEPS channels as leverage and transfer 
pricing are significantly lower than the ones found in the studies on the strategic use of 
intangible assets. As argued before, Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), for example, argue that a 
one percentage point increase in a tax rate leads to a 3.5-3.8% decrease in the number of 
patent applications in a given country. This comparison leads to the conclusion that 
multinationals use intangibles as one of the primary instruments of response to changes in 
taxation.  
There are a few reasons why our findings suggest even greater values of tax semi-elasticity 
than patent-applications literature. Frist of all, our results reflect the impact of taxation not 
only on the location of intangibles, but capture the quality of intangible assets as well. Since 
higher royalties are paid for the use of more valuable intangibles, multinationals have an 
incentive to re-locate primarily more valuable IP to low-tax countries. The analysis using data 
on royalty payments captures therefore both effects, the tax elasticity of intangibles’ location 
and the tax elasticity of their quality. Besides, the difference in the magnitude of the effects 
might be caused by the fact that we conduct an analysis on a country level, while the authors 
of patent-applications literature implement their investigation on a firm level. However, this 
variation in estimation approaches should not be essential to the results. For example, 
an instrument for profit shifting. Data on royalties, on the other hand, reflect payments for the right to use not 
only patents, but also trademarks, copyrights, industrial processes, know-how, and other intangibles, which 
might even have higher tax elasticity than patents. 
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literature on the impact of taxation on the amount of profits reported by multinational 
companies includes numerous empirical studies on a country- and firm level. While the 
authors who work on the country level, such as Hines and Rice (1994), Clausing (2009) etc. 
find the tax semi-elasticity of reported profits to lie around -2.3, the ones that carry out 
analysis on a firm level, such as Huizinga and Leaven (2008), Grubert (2012) etc. argue in 
favour of approximately -1.3. Therefore, even though aggregated data usually seems to lead to 
greater economic significance of the empirical outcomes, the difference should not be crucial 
if a proper set of control variables and fixed effects is included into estimations.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main data sources and the 
construction of key variables. The next part presents a detailed description of our 
identification strategy. Section 4 gives a summary of the key findings followed by a few 
robustness checks and a couple of extensions to primary estimation. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data Description 
2.1 Data Sources 
The final sample includes sixty-one countries and a time span from 1990 to 2012. Since the 
empirical analysis is carried out on a country-pair level, there are 3,660 country-pairs, which 
enter the final panel dataset. Figure 2 presents a map of states that are covered in this study 
and specifies the number of observations that is available for each jurisdiction. One can see 
that the majority of data points come from the United States and Western Europe.  
The dependent variable was constructed using statistics on bilateral royalty flows, which 
were obtained from the OECD database called Trade in Services - EBOPS 20029. Data on 
taxation, which constitutes the main independent variable of interest, come from a few 
different sources. For example, information on domestic withholding tax rates as well as on 
corporate income tax (CIT) rates and the tax credit systems for royalty payments comes from 
a series of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) Global Corporate Tax 
Handbook10. Statistics on bilateral withholding taxes, as well as details on tax treaties 
between country-pairs are taken from the IBFD Research Platform11.  
 
9 Available at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/data/oecd-statistics-on-international-trade-in-services_tis-data-
en 
10 See International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) (1990-2012), Global Corporate Tax Handbook, 
Amsterdam: IBFD. 
11 Available at:  http://www.ibfd.org/ 
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Figure 2. Coverage Map 
 
 
Besides, information on total R&D expenditures comes from the OECD database called 
Gross domestic expenditure on R-D by sector of performance and source of funds.12 Data on 
GDP per capita and countries’ population were collected from the World Bank’s 
Development Indicators13. Information on Property Rights was obtained from the Heritage 
Foundation14. Furthermore, statistics on bilateral trade are publicly available from the OECD. 
A relevant dataset in this case is called STAN Bilateral Trade in Goods15. Micro-level data on 
the structure of multinational enterprises in different countries were gathered from the Orbis 
database provided by Bureau van Dijk and eventually aggregated at the country level. Finally, 
details on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stocks were collected from the OECD database 
FDI Positions by Partner Country
16.  
 
 
12 Available at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=GERD_FUNDS 
13 Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
14 Available at: http://www.heritage.org/index/ 
15 Available at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=BTDIXE_i3# 
16 Available at: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_POSITION_PARTNER 
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2.2 Definition of Main Variables 
Royalty Flows is the dependent variable measured in millions of US Dollars. It represents the 
total of royalty payments from source country S to recipient state R. Since between many 
states there is no exchange of royalties at all, this variable is concentrated at zero.  
The main independent variable of interest is Royalty Tax, which denotes the effective tax rate 
on royalty transfers from country S to state R. The value of this variable depends on the way 
double taxation is avoided between both countries. In order to calculate Royalty Tax, formulas 
summarized in the Table 1 were used.  
Table 1. Effective Taxation of Royalty Payments 
Exemption �௦����� + �௦ 
Ordinary Tax Credit 
if �௦ ≥ ݐ௥ �௦����� + �௦ 
if �௦ < ݐ௥ �௦����� + ݐ௥ 
Deduction �௦����� + �௦ + (1 − �௦) ݐ௥ 
 
For example, in case of an exemption, the effective tax on royalty payments from S to 
recipient state R is calculated as the sum of the local tax on royalties τslocal 17 and the 
withholding tax �௦. If an ordinary-credit system applies to the transaction, then Royalty Tax 
will consist either of  τslocal  and the withholding tax or τslocal and the corporate income tax in 
the recipient state tr. The final value of Royalty Tax in this case depends on whether the 
withholding or corporate tax rate is higher. If taxes on royalty income abroad can be deducted 
in a recipient country, the effective tax rate on royalties will comprise a special local tax, a 
withholding tax, as well as tr on the income after deduction of a withholding tax.  
The calculation of Royalty Tax can also be demonstrated using an example. Take a transaction 
of royalty payments from Germany to Poland in 2012. According to the tax treaty between 
both countries, an ordinary credit applies to the taxes paid on royalties at source. The 
withholding tax on royalties flowing out of Germany to Poland is 0% due to the EU Interest 
and Royalties Directive (2003)18. However, starting from 2008 royalties that are flowing out 
of Germany are not fully deductible from the tax base of the local business tax on income. 
This implies that royalties are partially taxed with the business tax in case of payments going 
17 τslocal  represents any other taxes on royalty outflows in a source state except for the withholding tax. 
18 See http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/interests_royalties/index_en.htm 
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out of the country. In other words, the German local special tax on royalties τslocal is 0.897%19. 
The statutory corporate income tax rate in Poland equals to 19%. Since ws < tr, the effective 
tax rate on royalties in this case corresponds to the sum of τslocal and tr or 19.897%. It is 
expected that a greater value of Royalty Tax on a transaction from S to R is negatively 
associated with total royalty flows that are actually transferred between these states. 
Another important independent variable of interest is Tax Difference. It was built following 
the ideas of Huizinga et al. (2008), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Ernst et al. (2014) and is 
meant to indicate a profit shifting incentive for multinationals. To be more exact, this variable 
captures the relative level of taxation in a given recipient country compared to the taxation 
levels in other potential royalty recipients. The Tax Difference is formulated as follows: 
                                               ��� ܦ���������௥ = � ( ݐ௥ − ݐ���≠௥ )��                                       (1) 
In Equation 1, tr denotes the tax rate on royalty income in the recipient country R, while tj 
stands for the corresponding tax in each of the alternative locations represented by J. For 
example, let’s assume that the source country S pays royalties only to two states, namely R 
and A, as shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. International Royalty Flows and Company Structure 
 
 
 
If the tax on royalty income is 40% in R, while it is 10% in S, and 20% in A, and if we ignore 
the weighting factor ρj for a moment, Tax Difference.r will amount to 50% (i.e. (40%-
10%)+(40%-20%)). A positive value of this variable indicates that there is an incentive for 
firms that are located in S and transfer royalty payments to R to change their business in a way 
that more royalties are staying in S or flowing to A instead.  
Of course, not all countries are equally important potential royalty recipients for firms located 
in S. Therefore, we introduce ρj which is a weighting factor and is constructed using firm-
level data on the structures of multinational companies. For example, assume there is a 
19 According to Section 8 No. 1(f) of GewStG, 6.25% of royalties should be added to the tax base of business tax 
on income. The business tax rate is different in each German municipality. However, following calculation of 
OECD effective corporate income tax rates, the business tax rate in Berlin (i.e. 14.35%, which is also close to the 
average of all federal states) is taken as a representative value for this calculation. The local special tax rate in 
Germany was then computed as follows: 6.25%*14.35%=0.89688%. 
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multinational company, which has one affiliate in S, two affiliates in R, and six affiliates in A. 
In this step it is irrelevant, which of the firms are parents and which ones are subsidiaries. Tax 
Difference (affiliates).r will then amount to 22.5% (i.e. (40%-10%)*2/8+(40%-20%)*6/8). 
Note that since the analysis undertaken in this study is implemented on a country level, we 
aggregate firm-level information on the international structures of multinationals in order to 
calculate the number of their affiliates in each country in our sample. This approach allows us 
to make our results more comparable to Huizinga et al. (2008) and other recent micro-level 
studies on profit-shifting. 
Alternatively, we attempt to compare the level of taxation in country R not with the states in 
which its partner S has affiliates, but rather with the ones in which S carries out real economic 
activity. In order to do this, another control variable Tax Difference (fdi).r  is calculated and 
represents a measure identical to Tax Difference (affiliates).r, but with a different weighting 
factor ρj. To be more precise, this variable is weighted rather by the amount of FDI stocks in a 
partner country then by the number of affiliates in it. For example, assume that neither R nor 
A has any FDI stocks in S, however, the FDI position of country S in R equals 50 and in A it 
amounts to 10. Tax Difference (fdi).r will then be 28.3% (i.e. (40%-10%)*50/60+(40%-
20%)*10/60). Now the tax rate in A gains greater weight, as in this country there are more 
direct investments of state S’ firms and therefore more real economic activity is assumed to 
take place. 
As for other control variables that enter our baseline specification, CIT in S is one of them. 
This variable represents the tax rate on royalty income in source country S. It is expected to be 
positively correlated with the dependent variable, taken that companies use royalty payments 
to decrease their tax base in high-tax source countries. Besides, in line with Dischinger and 
Riedel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Griffith et al. (2014) etc., we also attempt to 
control for the level of innovation in a recipient state. Log(Country's R&D Exp.) is used as a 
proxy for this factor and measures the total amount of a country’s expenditures on R&D. 
Including this variable into the estimation equation is essential, since more innovative states 
should be receiving more royalties in the absence of taxes. Thus, the influence of this factor 
on royalty flows is predicted to be positive.  
Moreover, following literature on the impact of taxation on patent applications (see e.g. 
Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Ernst and Spengel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Ernst 
et al. (2014), Griffith et al. (2014) etc.), we control for the market size in a recipient state, its 
wealth, and governance situation by including respectively Log(Population), 
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Log(GDP/capita), and Property Rights into the regression estimations. Furthermore, in line 
with Collins and Shackelford (1998), Log(Trade) is added to our baseline model as another 
independent variable. It denotes the sum of total exports and imports between two countries20 
and is taken as a proxy for the strength of their economic partnership. One could expect that 
country-pairs with greater exchange of goods, and therefore a closer economic partnership, 
are going to exchange more royalties with each other as well.  
2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Before proceeding to the regression estimations, it might be useful to look at some descriptive 
statistics of variables generated in the previous section. Table 2 briefly summarizes main 
variables and shows, for example, that Log(Country's R&D Exp.) slightly restricts the sample 
because of a limited number of years covered by this variable. Furthermore, all tax controls 
are strictly positive and, as specified earlier, the dependent variable Royalty Flows is centred 
at zero (to be exact, around 40% of its values equal to zero).  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Royalty Flows 50413 46.12 413.10 0.00 15562.45 
Royalty Tax 50413 0.29 0.09 0.00 0.61 
Tax Difference(affiliates) 48129 -0.04 0.12 -0.38 0.32 
CIT in S 50413 0.27 0.09 0.00 0.55 
Log(Country's R&D Exp.) 31003 8.72 1.71 4.15 12.89 
Log(GDP/capita) 49159 9.43 1.22 5.99 11.67 
Log(Population) 49469 16.60 1.93 10.27 21.02 
Property Rights  46752 65.94 23.16 5.00 95.00 
Log(Trade btw.S and R) 47603 13.11 2.52 0.12 20.24 
Note: Royalty Flows is measured in millions of US Dollars. Property Rights   is an index and ranges 
from 0 to 100.  
Table 3 presents additional details on the main independent variable of interest Royalty Tax 
and its components. The values of this variable range from 0% to 61% and its average lies at 
around 29%. Generally, higher rates of Royalty Tax can be observed in the 1990’s, especially 
between countries that avoid double taxation with the help of a deduction method, which 
proves to be less favourable for companies than such double taxation relief systems as an 
ordinary credit or an exemption. Furthermore, Table 3 shows that the final withholding tax, 
20 Since the dependent variable Royalty Flows is actually a part of trade in services, only exports and imports of 
goods are considered for the construction of Trade. 
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which enters the calculation of Royalty Tax, comprises either a unilateral domestic rate or 
bilateral rate of a treaty or taxation according to the EU Interest and Royalties Directive 
(2003)21. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Royalty Tax and its Components 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Royalty Tax 50413 0.29 0.09 0.00 0.61 
Final WHT in country S 50413 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.40 
Unilateral WHT in S 50413 0.18 0.10 0.00 0.40 
Bilateral WHT between S and R 30534 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.40 
EU-Level WHT in S 5564 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.10 
Additional Local Tax in country S 6342 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
CIT in country R 50413 0.28 0.08 0.10 0.55 
Note: all variables in the table are measured in percent from 0 to 1. WHT stands for withholding tax 
(on royalties) and CIT denotes corporate income tax. Countries S and R represent a source country 
and a recipient state respectively. 
 
Table 4 provides some details on various systems of double taxation relief in the sample. In 
around 85% of cases, an ordinary credit is granted in a recipient state on withholding taxes, 
which were paid in a source country. Around 10% of country-pairs in our sample have not 
agreed upon specific rules on the provision of double taxation relief. However, the 
corresponding recipient states either exempt or allow a deduction of taxes on royalty inflows 
paid at source.  
Table 4. Main Types of Double Taxation Relief (DTR) 
  Freq. Percent Cum. 
Ordinary Credit 43100 85.49 85.49 
Deduction Method 2390 4.74 90.23 
Have No Specific DTR Rules, 4923 9.77 100 
but exempt royalties income 3211 65.22 65.22 
but usually allow deduction  1412 34.78 100 
        
Total 50413 100   
Finally, some information about the development of the total Royalty Flows and the average 
Royalty Tax over the years is shown in Figure 4. Only a few countries such as Germany, 
France, the UK, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States are analysed here. 
Panel A of Figure 4 shows a general increase of the total Royalty Flows between these states 
and their partners over time. This trend seems to be steadier in such states as Germany, the 
United States, Japan, or France and significantly steeper during recent years in the 
21 It is therefore assumed that the conditions, under which EU Interest and Royalties Directive (2003) applies, are 
fulfilled between all countries in our dataset. 
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Netherlands and Ireland. Panel B of Figure 4 provides some details on the average Royalty 
Tax between the selected countries and their partners during a given time frame. A gradual 
decline of the Royalty Tax over time can be observed in all states. This is due to a steady 
decrease of its main components such as withholding tax rates and corporate income tax rates 
all over the world, as well as because of the introduction of double taxation relief systems, the 
EU Interest and Royalties Directive (2003) etc.  
Figure 4. Panel A: Total Royalty Flows of Selected Countries (logarithm of Millions of US Dollars); 
Panel B: their Average Royalty Tax Rates (in percent), 1990-2011 
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3. Estimation Strategy 
A higher net tax rate on royalties is expected to be negatively correlated with royalty flows from 
country S to state R. Besides, a greater difference between the tax rate on royalty income in a 
recipient country R and at alternative locations is predicted to be negatively associated with the 
amount of royalty flows from S to R. In order to test these ideas, the following model of estimation 
was applied: 
                                    �����ݐ� ����ݏ௦௥� = �଴ +  �ଵ���௦௥� +  �ଶ  ܥ��௦�  + �ଷ  �′௥� + 
                                                                         +  �ସ �����௦௥� +  �௦௥  +   �� +  �௦௥�                                                (2)                              
In Equation 2, Royalty Flowssr is the dependent variable and denotes flows of royalty payments 
from country S to state R in year t. Taxsr is the main independent variable of interest and is 
represented by Royalty Taxsr, which denotes the effective tax rate on a royalty payment between a 
source state and a recipient country, or by either Tax Difference(affiliates)r or Tax Difference(fdi)r, 
which stand for the weighted average of tax differentials between R and all alternative recipients of 
royalty payments. CITs represents the corporate income tax rate in source country S in year t. �′௥ is 
the vector of the recipient country’s characteristics such as Log(Country's R&D Exp.), 
Log(Population), Log(GDP/capita), Property Rights etc. �����௦௥ denotes the log of all exports and 
imports of goods between two states in a given year. µsr and ϑt are country-pair and time fixed 
effects respectively. ɛsr is an error term.  
The dependent variable Royalty Flows is centred at zero. A common approach of dealing with such 
issues in trade literature is to take a logarithm of this variable, which, however, leads to eliminating 
zero-values from the sample and might cause a bias if those are non-random. Therefore, the 
identification strategy of this empirical analysis follows the suggestions of Wooldridge (2002), 
Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2011) etc., who use the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood 
(PPML) estimator in a fixed-effects panel framework to address a non-linear form of the model and 
avoid deleting zeroes at the same time. In addition, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that using the 
PPML estimator in an analogous framework helps to deal with heteroskedasticity, which is often 
observed in this type of data. 
4. Results 
4.1 Baseline Results 
The outcomes of the regression analysis described in section 3 are presented in Tables 5. In all 
estimations Royalty Flows is the dependent variable and country-pair as well as time fixed effects 
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are included. Column I presents the results of the estimation with Royalty Tax being the only 
independent variable, while column II adds further controls. The findings presented in this table 
imply that on average a one percentage point decrease in the net tax rate on bilateral royalty 
payments leads to a 6.0% increase in their bilateral royalty flows, holding other factors constant.  
Column III shows the results with a one-year lag of Royalty Tax as the main independent variable of 
interest. This modification to the baseline estimation does not seem to have an important effect on 
economic or statistical significance of the main findings. Column IV represents a regression 
estimation, where instead of Royalty Tax its two main components are included, namely 
Withholding Tax at source and CIT in a recipient state R. The latter appears to have a greater 
economic and statistical significance for the determination of Royalty Flows, which is not surprising 
considering that in approximately 86% of country-pairs the income tax rate in a recipient state 
exceeds the withholding tax levied on royalty outflows at source. Therefore, taxation in a recipient 
country seems to be decisive for the net taxation of royalty flows, no matter what type of double 
taxation relief applies. 
The next columns of Table 5 show the results of the estimations in which tax differences are the 
main independent variables of interest. For instance, columns V and VII present regression 
outcomes where Tax Difference(affiliates) and Tax Difference(fdi) are the only controls, while 
Columns VI and VIII add other independent variables to the estimations. According to these 
findings, on average a one percentage point decrease in the tax differential between a given 
recipient country and alternative recipient locations leads to a 2.7-3.2% increase in royalty flows 
from a source state to this recipient. Hence, multinationals seem not only to consider tax rates on 
royalty income in their absolute form, but also see their relative levels compared to other potential 
royalty recipients. 
As for other independent variables, the results seem to be in line with previous literature. For 
example, consistent with Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Griffith et al. 
(2014) etc., who analyse patent-applications data, we also find an economically and statistically 
significant association between a country’s level of innovation, represented by Log(Country's R&D 
Exp.), and its total royalty inflows. Moreover, a higher level of property rights protection also seems 
to contribute positively to royalty inflows into this state. Besides, growing trade volumes between 
two given countries, which indicate a growing economic cooperation, are likely to trigger greater 
amounts of royalties flowing between them. Market size, represented by a country’s population, 
does not seem to play a role in the determination of royalty flows. Besides, GDP per capital as a 
proxy for a country’s wealth seems to be negatively correlated with royalty payments. 
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Table 5. Regression Results: Royalty Flows and Tax Rates 
  I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Royalty Tax -6.001*** -6.085***             
  (1.540) (1.665)             
Royalty Tax t-1     -5.938***           
      (1.670)           
Withholding Tax in S       0.613         
        (0.937)         
Tax Difference(affiliates)         -3.180*** -3.209***     
          (0.924) (0.998)     
Tax Difference(fdi)             -2.787*** -2.728*** 
              (0.812) (0.900) 
CIT in R       -6.080***         
        (1.686)         
CIT in S   -0.190 -0.181 -0.164   -0.165   -0.503 
    (0.592) (0.578) (0.585)   (0.595)   (0.685) 
Log(Country's R&D Exp.)   0.986*** 0.920*** 0.968***   0.953***   1.063*** 
    (0.360) (0.353) (0.359)   (0.368)   (0.384) 
Log(GDP/capita)   -1.381** -1.316** -1.401**   -1.342**   -0.909 
    (0.665) (0.634) (0.659)   (0.675)   (0.773) 
Log(Population)   0.195 0.305 0.132   0.0244   -0.304 
    (1.287) (1.293) (1.289)   (1.312)   (1.541) 
Property Rights    0.00979** 0.0108** 0.00999**   0.0102**   0.0119** 
    (0.00461) (0.00450) (0.00469)   (0.00478)   (0.00606) 
Log(Trade btw.S and R)   0.506*** 0.515*** 0.502***   0.530***   0.326 
    (0.138) (0.134) (0.133)   (0.142)   (0.241) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Pair Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 28,165 18,909 18,909 18,909 27,190 18,147 18,808 11,851 
No. of country pairs 1,871 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,799 1,440 1,337 1,024 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observational units are country pairs. The Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood 
model is applied in all estimations. The dependent variable is Royalty Flows, which measures the total of royalty payments from a source country S to a recipient state R. 
Royalty Tax is the effective tax on royalty flows from S to R. Withholding Tax in S denotes a withholding tax on royalty payments in a source country.  CIT in R and CIT in 
S are effective income tax rates on royalties in R and S respectively. Tax Difference(affiliates)and Tax Difference(fdi) are weighted averages of  tax  differences between 
royalty  taxation  in R and  alternative  recipient  countries; the first term uses company-structure data, while the second one uses FDI information for constructing the 
weights. Log (Country's R&D Exp.) denotes a logarithm of total expenditures on R&D in a recipient R. Log (GDP/capita) measures GDP per capita in a recipient state. Log 
(Population) represents a logarithm of country R’s total population. Property Rights is an index that ranges from 0 to 100 and represents the level of recipient country's 
property rights' protection. Log(Trade btw.S and R) denotes a logarithm of trade in goods between a source country and a recipient state. 
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4.2 Robustness Checks and Extensions 
Table 6 presents results of a few robustness checks that were implemented within the scope of this 
study. For example, Columns I and II show results of the final sample’s division in two time 
periods, namely the ones of 1990-2001 and 2002-2012. It should be noted that the first estimation 
includes considerably less observations compared to the second one, because data on royalty flows 
as well as some country controls are often limited for the 1990’s. As for the impact of taxation on 
bilateral royalty flows, it turns out to be economically and statistically stronger in more recent 
years. Another interesting difference between these two time periods is the effect of taxation levels 
in a source country on royalty payments. It seems that in the first time period there was a positive 
association between taxation at source and royalty outflows from a country, however, this effect 
disappears in the more recent time span. 
Column III of Table 6 shows the outcomes of the regression estimations without time fixed effects, 
while column IV displays results of the additional exclusion of country-pair fixed effects. These 
changes to the baseline identification strategy do not seem to influence the statistical significance of 
the main results. However, they play a role in the determination of the effect’s size. Column V 
presents regression outcomes after clustering observations on a recipient-country level. This 
modification does not seem to be relevant for the significance of our main findings. 
Columns VI and VII present the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations used in the 
same framework as the baseline model. In these specifications, the impact of Royalty Tax on the 
dependent variable stays statistically significant. However, it appears to lose its economic 
importance. This difference can be explained through changes in the dependent variable. Namely, 
using the PPML estimator allows keeping zero-values in the dependent variable, while the OLS 
estimator requires taking a logarithm of Royalty Flows, which leads to the exclusion of its zero-
valued observations and is therefore likely to cause biased results. 
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Table 6. Robustness Checks 
  I II III IV V VI VII 
  1990-2001 2002-2012 No Fixed Eff. No Fixed Eff. Clustering OLS OLS 
Royalty Tax -3.230* -5.753*** -7.917*** -3.972** -6.494*** -1.398*** -1.048*** 
  (1.838) (2.015) (1.968) (1.683) (1.400) (0.307) (0.304) 
CIT in S 1.706** -0.551 -0.335 -0.387 -0.101   0.369 
  (0.674) (0.709) (0.594) (1.634) (0.472)   (0.356) 
Log(Country's R&D Exp.) 1.741* 1.039*** 1.227*** 0.889*** 1.086***   0.371* 
  (0.901) (0.322) (0.323) (0.253) (0.400)   (0.225) 
Log(GDP/capita) 1.038 -1.522** -0.820 2.090*** -1.521*   -0.667* 
  (2.045) (0.647) (0.655) (0.425) (0.795)   (0.397) 
Log(Population) -6.432 2.053 3.901*** -0.406 0.122   -1.246 
  (4.807) (2.114) (1.301) (0.315) (1.355)   (0.998) 
Property Rights  0.0389*** 0.0127** 0.00299 -0.00604 0.00891**   0.00658* 
  (0.0134) (0.00555) (0.00548) (0.0101) (0.00439)   (0.00354) 
Log(Trade btw.S and R) 0.0283 0.269 0.685*** 0.790*** 0.534***   0.593*** 
  (0.256) (0.175) (0.121) (0.0544) (0.0534)   (0.0723) 
Constant       -30.13*** -3.811 -0.218 16.01 
        (5.532) (21.31) (0.150) (17.46) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Pair Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster at recipient R level         ✓     
Observations 2,954 13,577 18,909 27,385 27,385 16,360 12,032 
No. of country pairs 661 1,487 1,504     1,871 1,505 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Observational units are country pairs. The Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood model is applied in estimations I-II, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator is used in columns VI-VII. The dependent variable is Royalty Flows, which 
measures the total of royalty payments from a source country S to a recipient state R; for the estimations in columns VI-VII, a natural logarithm of Royalty Flows was 
used as the dependent variable. Royalty Tax is the effective tax on royalty flows from S to R. CIT  in S  is  an   effective  corporate  income  tax  rate  on  royalties  in  a  
source  country  S.   Log (Country's R&D Exp.)  denotes  a  logarithm  of  total  expenditures   on  R&D  in  a  recipient   country. Log (GDP/capita) measures GDP per 
capita in a recipient state.  Log(Population)   represents  a   logarithm  of  country  R's  total population. Property Rights is an index that ranges from 0 to 100 and 
represents the level of a recipient country's property rights' protection. Log(Trade btw.S and R)  denotes a logarithm of trade in goods between a source country and a 
recipient state. 
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In addition to the baseline results, this study also provides an empirical analysis of the 
implementation of a few important reform ideas that are currently discussed within the scope of the 
OECD Action Plan on BEPS. For example, Action 5 of the Plan stresses the significance of 
following a so-called Nexus Approach, according to which the profits from transfer or use of 
intangible assets should be taxed in the place of their creation. This issue is especially relevant in 
the context of IP Box regimes. On the one hand, there are IP Boxes that allow an application of the 
favourable rules only in case a company have developed intangibles itself. On the other hand, there 
are IP Boxes that permit an application of adventurous regimes to acquired IP as well. The letter 
type of IP Boxes is not consistent with the Nexus Approach, since it encourages firms to develop 
intangibles in high-tax countries and re-locate them in a way that the profits that these assets are 
generating are taxed in low-tax jurisdictions. A worldwide overview of the IP Box regimes is given 
in Table 7. 
Table 7. Countries with IP Box Regime in Place in 2012 
Country 
IP Box Tax 
Rate 
Statutory Tax 
Rate 
Type of IP allowed 
Acquired Existing 
Belgium 6.8 33.99 N N 
China 0-12.5a 25 Nb N 
Cyprus 2.5 10 Y Y 
France 16.245 34.43 Y Y 
Hungary 9.5 19 Y Y 
Liechtenstein 2.5 12.5 Y N 
Luxembourg 5.78 28.9 Yc Y 
Malta 0 35 Y N 
Netherlands 5 25 N N 
Spain 12 30 N Y 
Source: Evers et al. (2014) and own research. Abbreviations: Y: Yes, N: No. Notes: 
The statutory tax rates correspond to the corporate income tax including any surcharge 
(Belgium, France and Luxembourg), local taxes (Luxembourg) and other taxes.  a The 
exact rate depends on the income size. b IP that was developed outside of China is not 
included into the IP Box. c In Luxembourg acquired IP is only eligible for the IP Box 
under certain circumstances. 
Columns I and II of Table 8 show the outcomes of incorporating IP Box regimes into the baseline 
model22. Column I, for instance, presents the results of integrating reduced IP Box tax rates into 
Royalty Tax. This change to the baseline specification does not seem to alter the significance of our 
main results. 
22 The information on IP Boxes was collected from Evers et al. (2014) and own research. 
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Table 8. Extensions 
  I II III IV V VI VII 
Royalty Tax -6.085*** -5.147*** -7.590*** -5.331*** -6.681*** -5.222*** -6.091*** 
  (1.665) (1.421) (1.957) (1.390) (1.632) (1.731) (1.670) 
IP_BoxAcq in S   0.301         0.287 
    (0.308)         (0.257) 
IP_BoxAcq in R   0.741**         0.667** 
    (0.312)           
IP_Box in S   -0.320           
    (0.332)           
IP_Box in R   -0.00678           
    (0.240)           
B_index in S     0.891**       0.592* 
      (0.410)       (0.337) 
B_index in R     0.440       0.495 
      (0.579)       (0.524) 
CFC Rules btw. S and R         -0.402**   -0.461*** 
          (0.167)   (0.164) 
TP Rules in S           0.237** 0.231* 
            (0.107) (0.129) 
TP Rules in R           0.278*** 0.271*** 
            (0.0799) (0.101) 
TP Rules in S*TP Rules in R           -0.0634** -0.0585* 
            (0.0261) (0.0326) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Pair Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,909 18,909 11,269 18,909 18,580 16,122 10,505 
No. of country pairs 1,504 1,504 940 1,504 1,474 1,399 939 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observational units are country pairs. The Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood model is applied. The dependent variable is Royalty Flows, which measures the total of royalty payments from a source country S to a recipient state R. 
Royalty Tax is the effective tax on royalty flows from S to R; RL Tax in column I incorporates IP Box tax rates; RL Tax in column IV accounts for the presence of CFC 
rules between S and R. IP_BoxAcq in S and in R are dummy   variables, which show a presence of an IP Box regime that is applicable to acquired IPs in state S and R 
respectively. IP_Box in S and in R are dummy variables which show the presence of an IP Box regime that is applicable to self-developed IPs only in state S and R 
respectively. B_index in S and in R represent B-indices in a source and a recipient country respectively; the lower the B-index, the more attractive is the tax system for 
R&D investments. CFC Rules btw. S and R is binary and equals one if CFC Rules apply between S and R; zero otherwise. TP Rules in S and in R are indices ranging 
from 0 to 5 and representing strictness of transfer pricing rules in S and R respectively. Controls include CIT in S, Log(Country's R&D Exp.), Log (GDP/capita), 
Log(Population), Property Rights, and Log(Trade btw.S and R). 
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Besides, it is interesting to see whether IP Boxes serve as an additional factor in attracting royalty 
flows. In order to test this idea, binary variables that capture the existence of IP Boxes were added 
to the baseline model. To be more exact, IP_Box is a dummy variable, which equals one, if an IP 
Box regime for self-developed intangibles is implemented in a given country and zero otherwise. 
IP_BoxAcq is also a dummy variable. It, however, equals one if acquired IPs are also eligible for the 
IP Box taxation privileges. If the opposite is the case, then it takes the value zero. In our sample, 
these two variables differ mainly throughout such countries as Belgium, China23, the Netherlands, 
and Spain. In these states, IP that qualifies for a lower IP Box tax rate include only self-developed 
and not acquired intangible assets. Column II of Table 8 shows that an introduction of an IP Box 
that is applicable to acquired intangibles and therefore does not follow the Nexus Approach will 
likely attract some additional royalty inflows into a recipient country. This is, however, not the case 
if a given IP Box applies exclusively to self-developed IPs.  
IP Boxes can be described as output-oriented R&D tax incentives, since their main objective lies in 
offering a favourable tax treatment of the profits generated by intangible assets24. It might, 
therefore, be interesting to compare the effect that IP Boxes have on royalties with the impact of the 
input-oriented R&D tax incentives. The letter type of R&D incentives usually includes tax credits 
and allowances and is typically measured in empirical literature by a so-called B-index25. It was 
first developed by Warda (2001) and is defined as follows: ܤ_����� = ଵ−(� ∙ � )(ଵ−� )                                                                (3) 
In Equation 3, ݐ  denotes the corporate income tax rate in a country, while ܣ represents the 
combined net present value of allowances and credits applying to R&D expenses. If an R&D 
investment is fully expensed in a given fiscal year, then  ܣ  is equal to one and so is the ܤ_����� . 
However, if, for example, a super deduction is available, which allows to deduct the double of the 
actual R&D expenses, then ܣ  will be greater than one, which leads to ܤ_����� being smaller than 
one. Therefore, lower values of the B-index correspond to a more attractive tax system for R&D 
investments. An overview of the B-index in different countries all over the world is given in Table 
9.  
 
23 In China, an intangible asset that was developed abroad is not eligible for the IP Box. 
24 There are, however, also IP Boxes that provide favorable treatment not only for IP income, but R&D expenses as 
well. 
25 Data on the B-index were taken from Ernst and Spengel (2011), Thomson (2013) and Chen and Dauchy (2013) and 
completed through own calculations. 
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Table 9. B-index in 2012 
Country B-index Country B-index 
Australia 0.808 Luxembourg 1.008 
Austria 0.887 Mexico 1.013 
Belgium 0.798 Netherlands 0.917 
Canada 0.823 New Zealand 0.827 
Chile 1.011 Norway 0.790 
Czech Republic 0.798 Poland 1.011 
Denmark 0.789 Portugal 0.498 
Finland 1.009 Slovakia 1.008 
France 0.944 Slovenia 0.915 
Greece 0.994 Spain 0.485 
Hungary 0.708 Sweden 1.013 
Iceland 1.014 Switzerland 1.007 
Ireland 0.944 Turkey 0.762 
Italy 0.819 UK 0.915 
Japan 0.864 USA 0.959 
Korea 0.900     
Source: Chen und Dauchy (2013) and own calculations. 
As for the empirical impact of the B-index on royalty flows, Column III of Table 8 shows that the 
value of this factor in a recipient country does not seem to affect royalty payments. However, the 
level of B-index in a source state appears to have a statistically significant influence on royalty 
flows. Note that the lower values of B-index actually indicate more favourable R&D tax incentives. 
This implies that an introduction of more advantageous R&D incentives in a country prompts 
multinationals to invest more into R&D in this state and thus leads to a decrease in the amount of 
royalty outflows. This result is not surprising, since a lot of input-oriented R&D tax incentives are 
designed in line with the Nexus Approach and thus are applicable only to intangibles that stay in the 
country of their development. In comparison to IP Box regimes that are allowed for acquired IP, 
input-oriented incentives do not seem to attract some extra royalty inflows into recipient countries 
and are therefore unlikely to facilitate profit shifting. 
In addition, we analyse two further proposals of the OECD Action Plan on BEPS, which are 
formulated in Action 3 and 7. The main idea behind both suggestions lies in increasing the 
effectiveness of international rules that aim at restricting profit shifting. These rules primarily 
include regulations concerning controlled foreign companies and transfer pricing. First of all, we 
augment our empirical analysis by including CFC26 rules into the estimations. A summary of 
26 The data on CFC rules were collected from Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and the International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation. 
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countries that have already introduced this type of regulations is shown in the Table 10. CFC rules 
usually apply to foreign affiliates of multinationals. Namely, if a tax rate of a subsidiary’s country 
falls below a certain threshold, the tax rate of a parent’s state applies to the passive income 
generated by this subsidiary. 
Table 10. Countries with CFC Rules in Place in 2012 
Country Conditions, under which CFC Rules are Binding 
Argentina Countries that are not on the "Cooperative States" list 
Australia Countries that are not on the "Cooperative States" list 
Brazil Always binding 
Canada Always binding 
China Effective tax rate is <50% of Chinese tax and a country is not on the "White List" 
Denmark Always binding 
Egypt Effective tax rate is <75% of the Egyptian tax 
Estonia Effective tax rate is <33% of Estonian tax and a country is not on the "White List" 
Finland Effective tax rate is <60% of Finnish tax or a country is on the "Grey List" 
France Effective tax rate is <50% of French tax 
Germany Effective tax rate is <25%  
Iceland Effective tax rate is <66% of Icelandic tax 
Israel Effective tax rate is <15% 
Italy Effective tax rate is <50% of Italian tax or a country is on the "Black List" 
Japan Effective tax rate is <20%  
Korea Average effective tax rate is <15% for most recent consecutive three years 
Lithuania Effective tax rate is <75% of Lithuanian tax or a country is on the "Black List" 
Mexico Effective tax rate is <75% of Mexican tax  
New Zealand Countries that are on the "Grey List" 
Norway Effective tax rate is <66% of Norwegian tax or a country is on the "Black List"1 
Portugal Effective tax rate is <60% of Portuguese tax or a country is on the "Black List" 
South Africa Effective tax rate is <75% of South African tax 
Spain Effective tax rate is <75% of the Spanish tax 
Sweden Effective tax rate is <55% of Swedish tax, except a country is on the "White List" 
Turkey Effective tax rate is <10% 
UK Effective tax rate is <75% of British tax 
Uruguay Effective tax rate is <12% 
USA Effective tax rate is <75% of the US tax 
Source: Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and own research. Notes: 1 the rules do not apply if a tax treaty exists 
 First of all, following Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and Griffith et al. (2014) we incorporate CFC 
rules into the calculation of Royalty Tax and present the corresponding results in Column IV of 
Table 827. This modification almost does not influence the results of the baseline estimation. 
27 In order to do so, we have to assume that a parent company is located in a source country and its subsidiary lies in a 
recipient state and that CFC rules apply to all royalty payments that flow from a given source country to the recipient 
state.  
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However, it is also interesting to see whether an introduction of CFC rules between a country-pair 
has an additional effect on its bilateral royalty flows. Thus, as a second step, a binary variable CFC 
Rules btw. S and R is added to the baseline model. It equals one if CFC regulations apply to a given 
country-pair in a given year and zero otherwise. The outcomes of this estimation are reported in 
Column V of Table 8. The dummy variable seems to have a negative impact on bilateral royalty 
flows; the effect is significant on a five-percent level.  
As the next step, the impact of transfer pricing regulations on royalty flows is also analysed in this 
study. Since royalties are transfer prices that are paid for the usage of intangible assets, TP 
regulations are expected to influence bilateral royalty flows. There are a few papers that investigate 
the correlation between TP rules and multinational’ profits or location decisions (see e.g. Lohse and 
Riedel (2012), Saunders-Scott (2013) etc.). However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study that aims at determining the correlation between this type of regulations and royalty flows.  
Table 11. Overview of International Transfer Pricing Regulations in 2012 
Country TP Rules Country TP Rules Country TP Rules 
Argentina 5 Hungary 4 Norway 4 
Australia 4 Iceland 1 Philippines 2 
Austria 2 India 5 Poland 4 
Belgium 2 Indonesia 5 Portugal 4 
Brazil 5 Ireland 3 Romania 3 
Bulgaria 2 Israel 4 Russia 3 
Canada 4 Italy 4 Singapore 2 
Chile 1 Japan 4 Slovakia 3 
China 5 Korea 4 Slovenia 4 
Cyprus 0 Latvia 2 South Africa 3 
Czech Republic 2 Liechtenstein 1 Spain 3 
Denmark 4 Lithuania 3 Sweden 3 
Egypt 3 Luxembourg 2 Switzerland 2 
Estonia 4 Malaysia 4 Thailand 2 
Finland 4 Malta 0 Turkey 4 
France 3 Mexico 5 UK 3 
Germany 3 Netherlands 4 USA 4 
Greece 4 New Zealand 2   
Source: Zinn et al. (2014) and own research. Notes: 0: no transfer pricing regulations; 1: arm's length 
principle was introduced in national tax law; 2: TP documentation requirement is not introduced, but 
documentation is required to exist in practice; 3: documentation requirement is introduced in national tax 
law, but full documentation must be available only upon request; 4: a short disclosure of TP 
documentation is required; 5: a long disclosure of TP documentation is required. 
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An index that was suggested by Zinn et al. (2014) was extended to cover more country-year 
observations28 and included into our baseline estimation model. Table 11 presents a worldwide 
overview of this measurement, which varies from 0 to 5 and reflects not only the mere existence, 
but also the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. As shown in Column VI of Table 8, 
implementing stricter TP rules in both, source country and recipient state, leads to a reduction of 
bilateral royalty flows between them. Finally, Column VII of Table 8 presents the outcomes of an 
estimation that incorporates all previously discussed additional control variables into the baseline 
model. It can be seen that the effects, which were found through a stepwise analysis stay mostly 
unchanged. 
5. Conclusions 
In comparison to other assets, intangibles have been rapidly gaining importance in the production 
process over the last few decades. However, intangibles are not just any assets. They do not only 
lead to an increase in firm’s competitiveness and profitability, but might also be strategically used 
for tax planning purposes. First of all, intangibles are highly mobile and thus may be relatively 
easily re-located among members of a multinational enterprise. Secondly, their true price is often 
hard to determine because of their unique nature. Hence, intangibles could be used for shifting 
profits between affiliated companies with a goal of minimizing global tax liability of a multinational 
group. The main goal of this study is to test whether intangibles constitute an important channel of 
profit-shifting by empirically analysing the role of corporate taxation in determining the direction 
and amounts of international royalty flows. 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is carried out using panel data on 3,660 country-pairs 
for the time period of 1990-2012. The Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator in a fixed-
effects framework is applied in the baseline model, where bilateral royalty flows serve as the 
dependent variable and a net tax rate on these payments constitutes the main independent variable 
of interest. According to our main results, on average a one percentage point decrease in the net tax 
rate on royalty payments from one country to another leads to a 6.0% increase in their bilateral 
royalty flows, holding other factors constant. Consistent with the literature on patent applications 
(e.g. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Griffith et al. (2014), Ernst et al. (2014) etc.), these findings 
suggest that multinationals use intangible assets as an important instruments of response to tax 
changes. 
28 The research was done with the help of Ernst & Young Transfer Pricing Global Reference Guide 2005-2012, KPMG 
Global Transfer Pricing Review 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011-2013, and PricewaterhouseCoopers International Transfer 
Pricing 2008-2012. 
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The contribution of this study to previous literature is twofold and lies in introducing a new 
methodology as well as addressing some innovative research questions. First of all, comparing to 
most previous papers in this area of research, we do not investigate the impact of taxation on stocks 
of intangibles, but rather look directly at how it affects international flows of royalty payments. In 
addition, we study not just an effect of net royalties’ taxation on the actual royalty flows from one 
country to another, but also calculate tax differentials, which represent a relative level of taxation in 
a recipient state compared to all other potential royalty recipients. Consequently, our findings show 
that on average a one percentage point decrease in the tax differential between a given recipient 
country and alternative recipient locations leads to a 2.7-3.2% increase in royalty flows from a 
source state to this recipient.  
Furthermore, we contribute to previous literature by analysing how an implementation of the OECD 
Action Plan on BEPS could affect bilateral royalty flows. This Plan includes several reform 
suggestions that aim at restricting the use of intangibles as an instrument for BEPS. These proposals 
embrace, for example, an implementation of the Nexus Approach as well as increasing the 
effectiveness of rules and regulations that insure an arm’s length principle and increase 
transparency of multinational’s global operations. For example, an enforcement of the Nexus 
Approach implies the elimination of IP Boxes that are applicable to acquired intangibles and allows 
only the self-developed assets to benefit from favourable tax regimes. According to our findings, 
this step is likely to trigger a decrease in royalty inflows into the countries, which currently have IP 
Boxes that are applicable to acquired IP. In addition, implementing stricter CFC rules and transfer 
pricing regulations in both partner states seems to lead to a fall in bilateral royalty flows between 
them as well. Therefore, it follows from our findings that an implementation of the Action Plan’s 
suggestions that are relevant for intangible assets has a potential to restrict the flows of non-
legitimate royalty flows and is thus likely to limit the use of intangibles as a channel of profit 
shifting. 
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